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1 INTRODUCTION
There is a long tradition of the application of eco-
nomic theories to 'political' phenomena, such as
voting behaviour or the behaviour of bureaucracies,
but it is only relatively recently that sociologists and
political scientists have attempted to use their theo-
ries to explain 'economic' phenomena. In this arti-
cle, I will show how concepts drawn from Max
Weber's theory of social closure can help to interpret
changes in the British consumer electronics industry
in the 1970s and 1980s, focusing in particular on the
processes by which the industry passed almost en-
tirely into Japanese ownership by the mid-1980s.
The article begins by presenting, in schematic terms,
a framework for understanding 'the market' in terms
of dynamic social processes. The section that fol-
lows presents a brief overview of the consumer
electronics industry in the early 1970s, and then
analyses in some detail the way in which power was
exercised as the domination of the industry by Brit-
ish firms was eclipsed. Finally, I offer some sugges-
tions as to how the political analysis of markets
might be further developed.
2 SOCIAL CLOSURE AND USURPATION
Weber's approach to understanding the operation of
markets was based on the fundamental point that
markets are essentially social processes, where par-
ties to market transactions develop a social relation-
ship. Unless in each case the transaction is both the
first and the last between the two parties, some kind
of continuing relationship is established, which to
some extent at least is ordered by norms and moral
considerations. The social aspect of market relation-
ships is not limited to those between buyers and
sellers, since sellers (and in many cases buyers also)
can orient their actions towards each other through
competition or collaboration.
Competition within markets is thus also a social
process (and not the impersonal mechanism beloved
of economics textbooks), and is properly seen as a
struggle: 'a formally peaceful attempt to attain con-
trol over opportunities and advantages which are
also desired by others' Success in this competition
is thus equated with power: firms which are success-
ful in denying advantages to their competitors are in
a position to exert power over them, and once power
is attained it tends to be defended. It is this process
of achieving and defending privilege that Weber
defines as social closure: a process in which power
is exercised to exclude others from access to those
opportunities. It is clear from Weber's account that
the essential dynamic of the market is not competi-
tion (in the sense that economists equate markets
with competition) but closure: the tendency towards
the development of monopoly power. Thus regula-
tion is required in order to counter this tendency and
to sustain relatively open access to opportunities; far
from state intervention always driving out competi-
tive processes, public authority is a necessary (but
not sufficient) condition for competitive markets.
But state power can also be exercised to maintain
closure, through such public policies as nationalisa-
tion, fostering 'national champion' firms, and pro-
tectionism. The firms themselves may seek help
from public authorities in defending their privi-
leges, action which may be regarded as protecting a
national interest, or a strategic technology.
We can identify a number of different strategies
through which economic actors (in this case, firms)
seek to achieve a dominant position in the market,
i.e. different modes of social closure within the
market. For the purposes of this analysis, a broad
categorization of three types of closure will be suffi-
cient: closure through competitive struggle, closure
through associative action, and closure through the
state.
In the first of these, firms orient their strategy aggres-
sively towards other producers through exploiting
any competitive advantage they might perceive. In
the case of the electronics industry, such advantages
will tend to come from innovation, and in some cases
closure may be reinforced through legal means, as
with patenting. As we shall see in the next section,
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the source of innovation may be either new products
or new ways of making existing products, and clo-
sure around product innovation may not be suffi-
cient to protect market power against firms which
are able to take advantage of process innovations to
reduce manufacturing costs.
In the second strategy, closure through associative
action, firms define their interests collectively in
terms of avoiding the kind of competition involved
in the first strategy. Such action is most common
where relatively small numbers of firms are in-
volved, and in relatively mature industries where
the pace of product innovation has slowed. At one
extreme, closure takes the form of the cartel, where
firms agree formally (even if illegally) to carve up the
market and remove competition altogether. More
common, and relevant to the case which follows, is
the formation of a collective identity through an
industry or trade association, where an informal
regulatory order is developed in which common
understandings between firms moderate the extent
of competitive behaviour.
The third form of closure strategy is where a firm or
firms seek to protect their dominant position by
invoking the authority of the state; or, alternatively,
when governments seek to achieve industrial policy
goals by privileging a particular firm as a 'national
champion' with subsidies, favoured purchasing and
so on. Firms may demand that governments enact
protectionist measures, or take other steps to insu-
late the firms from competitors.
Each of these strategies is defined here as an ideal
type; in actual situations firms may pursue two or
even all three of these strategies at the same time
given that they operate in different time frames. In
the mid-1980s, for example, the response of Philips
to the ferocious competition from Japanese firms in
the video recorder market was to seek protection
from the European Commission, coordinate collec-
tive action through the European Association of
Consumer Electronics Manufacturers (EACEM), and
invest heavily in new products and process tech-
nologies. Closure through the state in the form of an
EC-negotiated voluntary export restraint agreement
with the Japanese was a short-term solution, action
2 For an extended discussion of usurpation developed from
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through EACEM was a medium-term response, and
closure through innovations such as digital sound
recording and multimedia technologies was a longer-
term effort to re-establish a dominant competitive
position.
As we have noted, closure involves the exclusion of
others from opportunities within the market. It is
hardly surprising that those who are excluded will
seek admission, and in Weberian theory the process
of seeking to undermine the basis of social closure is
known as usurpation.2 We can also distinguish
different types of usurpation strategies which corre-
spond to the three kinds of closure strategies identi-
fied earlier; that is, through competitive action,
through associative action, or through the state.
Successful usurpation creates in turn the basis of
social closure, so that we can see as the essential
dynamic of market processes a continual dialectic
unfolding over time between closure and usurpa-
tion whereby power relations are subject to chal-
lenge and relations of domination are under threat
from the dominated.
The following analysis applies these concepts to the
British consumer electronics industry over two dec-
ades.3 It shows how the existing firms in the industry
(largely British-owned) were displaced (usurped)
by foreign firms, principally because by fostering an
inward-looking stance through membership of the
trade association, the firms failed to anticipate the
nature of the usurpation strategies of the Japanese
firms. In this case, the social (in the conventional as
well as the Weberian sense) relationships between
producers inhibited their ability to react strategically
to the threat to their dominant position.
3 THE DYNAMICS OF THE BRITISH
CONSUMER ELECTRONICS MARKET
The principal product of the major consumer elec-
tronics firms in Britain in the 1970s was colour
television. The switch from black and white sets in
the late 1960s had created an exceptional set of
opportunities for the firms, since the new colour
technology (PAL - phase alternation by line) had
been invented by Telefunken in Germany and cross-
licensed to Thorn in Britain, which enabled those
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firms to control entry to the industry. Initially,
licences were only available to foreign firms for
small-screen sets (which formed a tiny proportion of
the British market) and to those firms which estab-
lished manufacturing plants in Britain. The sets
were complex, and expensive, and at £500 were the
same price as the cheapest car.
At the beginning of the decade nine firms were
producing colour TVs - seven British, one Dutch and
one American. They all belonged to the British
Radio and Electronic Equipment Manufacturers'
Association (BREMA), which, although it did not
function as a formal cartel controlling supply and
prices in the industry, did serve to orient producers'
actions towards each other by the exchange of infor-
mation about prices and quantities. The shared
perceptions and informal monitoring of the market
led BREMA members to the view that their interest
lay in maintaining high prices and margins through
the moderation of competition, and the informal
agreement served to reduce the pressure on firms to
seek innovations in the products themselves, or the
way in which they were manufactured. Thus clo-
sure through associational action was the preferred
strategy of the firms.
The Japanese firms, who had been allowed under
the terms of the PAL licence only to produce small-
screen sets, began to make very rapid inroads into
the overall colour TV market. Their own trade
association, the Electronic Industries Association of
Japan (EIAJ), had established a European branch in
Dusseldorf in 1962, and since then had been supply-
ing market intelligence to its member firms. The
BREMA firms had no comparable understanding of
the way in which the Japanese firm operated, since
markets in Europe were tightly segmented along
national lines, and none of the firms had any interest
in competing on the Japanese market.
The reaction of the British firms to the erosion of their
market share was to cry foul, and to suggest that the
Japanese TV sets were being dumped at below their
market price. This was an understandable reaction
when Japanese quality/price combinations were
judged against British manufacturing costs and prac-
tices. The newly-formed Sectoral Working Party
(SWP) of the UK National Economic Development
Office decided to investigate, and commissioned the
Boston Consulting Group to undertake a compara-
tive study of television manufacturing in Britain,
Germany, Korea and Japan. The conclusions of the
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report were so explosive, and potentially damaging
to the British firms, that SWP members were sworn
to secrecy. The report showed that Japanese firms
achieved their significant cost and quality advan-
tages over the British through innovations in set
design (reducing the number of components) and in
manufacturing (through using machines to insert
components automatically). Moreover, the most
modern plants in Japan could make 1 million sets per
year against the British industry average of 250,000.
At this point, the closure strategy of the firms
switched from associative action to a state-backed
mode. The SWP agreed a major programme of plant
closures and rationalization, which would have re-
duced the number of firms in the industry and
created much larger plants. Some £80 million of
government aid was sought, but the general election
of 1979 occurred before the plan could be realised,
and the incoming Thatcher government was implac-
ably opposed to such industrial policy solutions.
In anticipation of the adoption of other kinds of
state-backed closure strategies, such as import re-
strictions and tariff increases, the Japanese firms
began to establish factories in Britain, beginning
with Sony and Matsushita in 1974 and 1976 respec-
tively. Under severe pressure from the domestic
industry, especially from Philips (ironically not Brit-
ish-owned), the government persuaded later en-
trants into joint ventures with British firms (GEC
with Hitachi and Rank with Toshiba). From 1977
until 1985, there was an informal ban on greenfield
investment in the consumer electronics industry by
Japanese firms.
The experience of these 'shotgun weddings' high-
lighted the very considerable differences in the way
in which British and Japanese firms operated, re-
flecting in broad terms differences between firms
employing closure strategies to defend an estab-
lished position, and firms seeking to usurp those
privileges. Whereas the British firms relied on infor-
mal understandings developed within the context of
the industry association to regulate competition, the
Japanese firms employed all three types of usurpa-
tion strategy combining elements of keen competi-
tive behaviour, effective associational action, and
the exploitation of government industrial policies.
The most important aspect of competitive behaviour
was an emphasis on product quality and reliability
in part arising from higher levels of automated
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assembly, but also consequent upon long-term,
closely supervised relationships with component
suppliers. This kind of competitive strategy was
unusual in the Western electronics industry, where
components tended to be bought on short-term 'spot'
contracts. The reputation of Japanese televisions
that became quickly established was symbolized by
the fact that identical televisions coming off the
GEC-Hitachi line were sold at a £40 premium if they
were badged 'Hitachi'.
The Japanese firms also brought with them distinc-
tive managérial and industrial relations strategies
which helped them to implement quality-based
manufacturing programmes. In many cases single
union agreements were introduced which embod-
ied defined procedures for arbitration of disputes.
In such cases, new entrants have considerable ad-
vantages over incumbent firms, who may have to
negotiate with several unions and who may have
established working practices which make innova-
tions in manufacturing processes more difficult.
The organizational skills of the EIAJ were also a
significant factor in assisting the Japanese firms to
usurp the dominant posItion of the British compa-
nies. Japanese subsidiaries joined the domestic trade
association BREMA in order to appear as good
corporate citizens, and tended to send their British
managers to BREMA meetings. But for technical and
market intelligence they relied on a system of paral-
lel representation coordinated through the EIAJ of-
fice in Dusseldorf. Among the services offered to the
firms by the EIAJ was the important one of offering
advice on plant location and the availability of gov-
ernment subsidies.
The third aspect of the Japanese firms' usurpation
strategy should not be neglected: the exploitation of
regional and industrial policies to offset some of the
cost and risk of inward investment. The first invest-
ment by Sony in 1974 had been in a development
area in Wales, for which about 18 per cent of the
initial investment was provided by the government.
Later on, when there began to be considerable com-
petition between European governments to attract
inward investment, the brokerage skills of the EIAJ
became particularly important. The decision by
Sharp in 1985 to open a video recorder factory in
4 See the series on Government-Industry Relations published by
Clarendon Press; L. Lindberg, JR. Hollingsworth and J. Campbell,
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North Wales was considerably influenced by excep-
tional levels of government assistance, amounting to
£6.5 million of a £10 million investment. For firms
like Thom EMI, who were based in 10-year old
plants in the South-east of England, the competition
coming from purpose-built factories employing a
hand-picked workforce in development areas was
seen as unfair, and there was considerable resent-
ment at government policies which seem to make
usurpation easier.
The outcome of this process was the steady exit of
British-owned firms from the industry. In 1967 eight
out of ten firms making televisions were British-
owned; in 1989 there was the same number of firms,
but none was British.
4 CONCLUSIONS
This article has outlined in schematic terms the
process of competition within a single product mar-
ket over a 20 year period. I suggested that the
outcome - the displacement of one set of firms by
another - could best be explained through making
use of a framework which recognized the impor-
tance of relations of power and domination within
markets. This framework recognizes that competi-
tion is far from being an impersonal mechanism or
an invisible hand, but is in practice a highly politi-
cal struggle between producers. Economic actors
operate within a social context, and their capacity to
respond is constrained by the nature of those social
relations, both within their organizations (i.e. the
firms) and between them within industry associa-
tions and in their relationships with government.
The framework sketched three principle types of
closure and usurpation strategies, and the case study
showed how these strategies were combined in prac-
tice, although the most striking feature of the case is
the unwillingness of the British firms to respond
through economically-oriented competitive behav-
iour. Instead, the firms (unsuccessfully) sought to
defend their dominant position through seeking
protection from the state. The collective ethos fos-
tered through their industry association prevented
the firms from recognizing the nature of the com-
petitive threat to which they were exposed. By the
time they did realize this, it was probably too late to
respond by increasing competitiveness.
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Similar studies of other industrial sectors4 suggest
considerable differences in the way in which 'sectoral
governance' takes place, with differences in industry
structure (such as number and size of firms) provid-
ing only a partial explanation for these. Research on
the organization of Japanese industry places consid-
erable emphasis on networks of inter-firm relation-
ships both vertically (in terms of supplier chains)
and horizontally (in terms of associations of firms
cutting across sectoral boundaries). At the very
least, the typology of closure strategies employed in
this article would need to be considerably refined in
order to accommodate inter-firm networks which
are not formalized within an industry association.
Such networks themselves show considerable van-
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ety, from short-term agreements, for example, in
R&D collaboration, to stable groups existing over
long periods reinforced by cross-shareholdings.
Compared to the simple elegance of formal eco-
nomic models, the political analysis of economic
markets reveals a good deal of complexity and vari-
ety. The available tools for making sense of this are
admittedly crude, and require refinement through
extensive empirical research. Now that the results of
such research across different industrial sectors and
different market economies is beginning to become
available, we should be in a better position to under-
take the task.
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